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Peter Park hones in on a conspicuously brief period during the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century when European historiographers recast the history of 
philosophy. In this new title for SUNY Press’s Philosophy and Race book series, he 
recounts a time of rapid transition that changed the way the history of philosophy was 
studied. Until the end of the eighteenth century, the history of philosophy began with 
what was then known in Europe as ‘the Orient’. Within a mere fifty years, however, 
this history was rewritten to exclude non-European parts of the world. How, Park 
asks, did the history of philosophy become the exclusive story of Europe, the Greeks 
and the West? 
Despite developments in classical scholarship and postcolonial studies, the notion of a 
purely Greek origin still persists. When it comes to other disciplines, the picture of 
pure Greek origins has waned ever since Martin Bernal’s tendentious three-volume 
Black Athena appeared, shining its light on a generalized neglect of ancient Egypt and 
Asia in academia. Recent work on the flows of communication between Greece and 
the Near East to be found in books by the likes of Walter Burkert (Babylon, Memphis, 
Persepolis) and Martin West (The East Face of Helicon) have done much to enhance 
understanding of Greco-Egyptian and Greco-Indian contact and intercultural 
transmission in the first millennium BCE. Philosophers, however, are inclined to 
avoid addressing philosophy’s own eurocentrism. This often means dismissing any 
mention of non-Greek origins and opting for a monogenealogical, purely Greek 
history. The chief exception is the work of Robert Bernasconi, and Park locates 
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Bernasconi’s writings as the launching pad for his own investigation. Co-editor of the 
Philosophy and Race series, Bernasconi has long recognised the problem of racism in 
contemporary philosophy, and, most importantly, encouraged philosophers to do 
something about it, asking them to explore the racism to be found within their own 
traditions, whether continental or analytic.  
This is the central concern of Africa, Asia, and the History of Philosophy too. 
Consequently, Park does not merely pose the question of racism in philosophy. That 
Kant advanced a theory of monogenesis, in which he attempted to explain human 
differences by defining races based on an understanding of skin colour as a permanent 
marker of race, is well covered in the previous literature. Bernasconi has written 
widely on it, as have Emmanual Chukwudi Eze and Mark Larrimore. Park’s is not, 
then, a book that simply denounces Kant and Hegel. Instead, it seeks a fuller picture 
of the context and reasons for their discussions of race. (In this, Park’s book is 
proximate to an earlier edited volume in the same SUNY series entitled, The German 
Invention of Race, which gives special attention to Kant’s concept of race in 
particular.)  What makes Park’s volume distinctive is the author’s proactive approach. 
With a narrow emphasis on changes in the writing of the history of philosophy 
beginning in the 1790s, he investigates how and why these changes came about at the 
specific time they did. Park takes sedulous care in exposing cracks in the history of 
philosophy’s foundation, and digs deeper to examine how each crack is connected. 
His research is based on texts from the early modern period to the early nineteenth 
century, recounting how prevailing attitudes among early modern historians of 
philosophy held ‘the Orient’ as the source of philosophy.  
In looking into Hegel’s motives for excluding the Orient from the history of 
philosophy, Park shows then, for example, that Hegel’s statements were, first and 
foremost, a defence against historical claims made by his more ‘theologically 
motivated critics’, particularly Friedrich Schlegel. In an earlier publication on 
Schlegel as a Sanskritist, Park argues for a re-examination of Schlegel’s comparative 
historical work on ancient Indian philosophy, noting that Schlegel pioneered a 
comparative, cross-cultural history of philosophy which explored Asian philosophy 
along with European philosophy in one historical context. Here, Park discusses 
Schlegel’s opposition to the opinion held by some historians of philosophy that the 
ancient Orient had no knowledge of philosophy. Although Schlegel acknowledged a 
lack of adequate documentation of Oriental philosophy, it did not follow that the 
Orient had no philosophy at all. Indeed, he believed Plato’s doctrine of transmigration 
was taken from Egypt and was characteristic of Indian thought: ‘In arguing that the 
Indians had real philosophy in respect to both form and method, Schlegel opposed 
himself to the nascent opinion among some historians of philosophy that the Orientals 
did not know philosophy’. 
In fact, only a tiny minority of eighteenth-century historians of philosophy claimed a 
Greek origin of philosophy. It was Kantians like Dietrich Tiedemann and Wilhelm 
Gottlieb Tennemann who argued for an exclusively Greek beginning. The Kantian 
School thus changed the rules for writing the history of philosophy so as to exclude 
Africa and Asia. A combination of a priori construction and racial Eurocentrism 
would come, in this way, to define modern histories of philosophy, initially justified 
with racial-anthropological arguments taken from Christoph Meiners. Park draws a 
connection between Meiners and Kant, suggesting that the two influenced each other 
in their concepts of race. More than Kant or Hegel, it is Meiners who Park credits 
with exclusion of Asia and Africa from the history of philosophy. 
Although he never published on the history of philosophy per se, Kant’s own lectures 
on logic promoted a history of philosophy that excluded any Asian or African legacy. 
Before the Greeks, Kant opines, people thought through images and not through 
concepts. Therefore, no one philosophized before the Greeks: ‘It is said that the 
Greeks learned their wisdom from the Egyptians. But the Egyptians are children 
compared to the Greeks. They have various cognitions, but not sciences. The Greeks 
first enlightened the human understanding.’ As Park notes, this position seems 
incongruous within its own eighteenth-century context, and hence Park finds it 
peculiar that Hegel should take up the Kantian position and incorporate it into his 
history of philosophy. Certainly, the exclusion of Egypt and Asia was not 
characteristic of the school of Absolute Idealism. As Park puts it: ‘It was a wayward 
step from Absolute Idealism, with which Hegel was united in many other ways’. Yet, 
in fact, Hegel’s abhorrence for Egypt and Asia went beyond even Kant’s disdain for 
the Orient. Park’s final chapter explores the reasons for this antipathy, focusing on the 
controversy between Hegel and the theologian August Tholuck, in which Hegel 
defended himself against charges of pantheism or theosophy (and potentially 
atheism). It is this defense which is offered by Park as an explanation for Hegel’s 
insistence on the exclusion of Africa and Asia from his history of philosophy. 
In Africa, Asia, and the History of Philosophy, Park looks ahead to a day when the 
history of philosophy might no longer be taught with such exclusions, yet does not 
lose his focus. Nor does he directly appeal to his readers to confront philosophy’s 
racist history or to challenge Europe’s self-identity and its relation to the history of 
philosophy. But in his reconsideration of the history of philosophy, Park seriously 
engages the racism still to be found at work in philosophy today.  
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